Schopenhauer on the Content of Compassion by Marshall, Colin
 1 
Final version to appear in Nous. 
 
 




Abstract: On the traditional reading, Schopenhauer claims that compassion is the recognition of 
deep metaphysical unity. In this paper, I defend and develop the traditional reading. I begin by 
addressing three recent criticisms of the reading from Sandra Shapshay: that it fails to 
accommodate Schopenhauer's restriction to sentient beings, that it cannot explain his moral 
ranking of egoism over malice, and that Schopenhauer requires some level of distinction to remain 
in compassion. Against Shapshay, I argue that Schopenhauer does not restrict compassion to 
sentient beings and that a more metaphysically refined version of the traditional reading can 
accommodate both Schopenhauer's moral ranking of characters and allow for some level of 
distinction in compassion. I then turn to four further questions for the traditional reading: what the 
relation is between the feeling of compassionate pain and the recognition of metaphysical unity, 
how cognitions mediate compassion, whether compassion is limited to the present, and how the 
feeling of compassion relates to Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle. I conclude by 




 What, if anything, does compassion tell us about the world? To answer this question, we 
might compare compassion with ordinary perceptual experience. Ordinary perception informs us 
about objects outside our minds. A visual perception, for example, might clue me into the fact 
that a grey squirrel is climbing onto my birdfeeder. In contemporary philosophical terms, the 
“that” clause in the previous sentence reports the content of the visual state. This content might be 
true or false, but its presence in perception helps make some beliefs justified or appropriate for 
the perceiving subject to hold. 
 Does compassion, like perception, have content and if so, what is it? In the European 
intellectual tradition, the philosopher with the most radical views on the topic is probably Arthur 
Schopenhauer. Sorting through Schopenhauer’s views provides an opportunity for getting clearer 
on the representational dimensions of compassion.  
 Readings of Schopenhauer’s views on the content of compassion fall into two general 
camps. According to one interpretative approach, its content is a radical metaphysical claim 
concerning the non-distinctness of individuals, a claim Schopenhauer takes to be true. This 
‘monist’ interpretation is inspired by passages like the following: 
 
plurality and difference belongs solely to mere appearance, and… one and the same 
essence… presents itself in everything that lives… [T]he basis of the phenomenon of 
compassion… the metaphysical basis of ethics… consist[s] in one individual’s 
immediately recognizing himself, his own true essence, in the other. (OBM 4:270, 253) 
 
A good conscience comes from the fact that unselfish deeds, arising out of the immediate 
recognition of our own essence in other appearances, confirm the recognition that our 
true self does not exist only in the single appearance of our own person, but in every 
living thing (WWRI 2:441, 400) 
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All genuine virtue proceeds from the immediate and intuitive knowledge of the 
metaphysical identity of all beings [metaphysischen Identität aller Wesen] (WWRII 
2:690, 601)1 
 
Schopenhauer seems to hold that compassion informs us about the truth of radical metaphysical 
monism, on which we are not really distinct from, say, the hungry squirrel for whom we might (or 
might not) feel compassion. That has the surprising consequence that compassion conflicts with 
ordinary perceptions, which seem to inform us that the squirrel is genuinely distinct from us. 
Another interpretive approach, which Christopher Janaway has dubbed the ‘axiological’ 
interpretation, instead takes the content for Schopenhauer to be primarily evaluative.2 Since the 
axiological interpretation can remain neutral on metaphysical monism, it can avoid positing any 
conflict between compassion and ordinary perception. In recent work, Sandra Shapshay has 
defended a novel version of the axiological interpretation (though it has some precedent in Iris 
Murdoch3). On her reading, which she dubs the ‘inherent value interpretation,’ Schopenhauer 
holds that compassion informs us that other sentient beings have inherent moral value. Shapshay 
takes Schopenhauer to be appealing to a form of non-reductive moral realism here, on which the 
fact that others have inherent value has no deeper explanation. So when Schopenhauer claims that 
compassion reveals to us that our own “inner essence exists in every living thing” (OBM 4:271, 
254), Shapshay suggests we take “essence” to have a purely normative significance, meaning 
“inherent value.”4  
My aim in this paper is to develop and defend a form of the monist interpretation. While 
the Monist Interpretation has been regarded as the default reading in most of the secondary 
literature, Shapshay raises three important criticisms of it that call for answers. In addition, close 
attention to the text presents a number of interpretive questions that require refining the 
interpretation beyond what previous commentators (myself included5) have done. The refined 
monist interpretation has Schopenhauer offering an intricate, provocative view that offers a 
unique perspective on the content of compassion.     
Three notes before proceeding. First, I should acknowledge a problem in applying the 
contemporary notion of content to Schopenhauer. The contemporary notion is most comfortably 
understood in a broadly linguistic framework, where a mental state has proposition P as its 
content just in case it (defeasibly) positions its subject to sincerely state a sentence with the 
content P.6 This is convenient for writing about content, since it allows sentences to reflect the 
content of mental states. For Schopenhauer, however, language is a tool for expressing only 
conceptual representation, whereas compassion is based in non-conceptual, ‘intuitive’ 
representation that “cannot be communicated through words” (WWRI 2:434, 395). Yet 
Schopenhauer himself uses words to describe the insight involved in compassion, so he must hold 
 
1 For references to Schopenhauer’s texts, I provide an abbreviated title, the volume and page number in the 
Hübscher edition of Schopenhauer’s works, followed by the page number in the relevant English 
translation listed in Works Cited below. I use the following abbreviations for Schopenhauer’s works: 
WWRI = World as Will and Representation, Volume I; WWRII, World as Will and Representation, 
Volume II; FW = “Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will”; OBM = “Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals”; 
P&PII = Parerga and Paralipomena, Volume 2. 
2 Janaway 2007, 61. See also Reginster 2015.  
3 See Murdoch 1993, 65, 73.  
4 Shapshay 2019a, 185. 
5 Marshall 2017a, Marshall 2017b. 
6 The exact link between mental content and linguistic behavior is more complex than this, of course (see, 
e.g., Kripke 1979). 
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that sentences can be used to at least gesture at what this insight involves – perhaps in a 
metonymic way.7  
Second, the axiological claim that we share inherent value with other beings does not 
imply any radical monist metaphysics, nor does monism imply any shared value. Hence, the 
inherent value interpretation and the monist interpretation are logically independent. They are 
compatible, but Schopenhauer does not suggest that compassion has a two-tiered content (though 
he does suggest there are different levels of compassionate insight). Hence, if we have strong 
grounds for accepting both, we might suspect that Schopenhauer accepts some reductive 
metaethical theory, on which the truth of monism transparently grounds the truth of our shared 
inherent value. Such a reductive theory would imply that a grasp of the monist truth amounts to a 
grasp of the evaluative claim. This is not a possibility Janaway or Shapshay explores,8 and I will 
return to it later. My main focus, though, is finding the exegetically best form of the monist 
interpretation. 
Third, many commentators, while acknowledging the monist elements of Schopenhauer’s 
ethical views, have offered revisions of his ethical views that bypass monism.9 I think this 
revisionist project is a worthwhile, and have elsewhere defended a non-monist neo-
Schopenhauerian metaethical view.10 However, I think that there may be surprising pay-offs to 
understanding the details of how monism plays into Schopenhauer’s ethics. Hence, the present 
paper focuses on figuring out Schopenhauer’s actual views, not how they might be productively 
revised.  
 
1. Shapshay’s criticisms of the monist interpretation 
 
 Shapshay grants that taking compassion to involve “an intuitive grasp of the non-
individuated nature of the metaphysical will” is “certainly a justified reading” of the key passages 
from OBM.11 She holds, however, that the monist interpretation faces certain textual problems 
that the inherent value interpretation does not, and implies that, in virtue of avoiding radical 
metaphysical commitments, the latter reading is more philosophically attractive.12 For present 
purposes, I bracket most issues of philosophical attractiveness and focus on Shapshay’s textual 
arguments. 
 As I read her, Shapshay provides three important criticisms of the monist interpretation, 
which she understands as construing the content of compassion as follows: “I (the compassionate 
person) recognize intuitively that the suffering other and I both share the same essence in itself, 
namely, the unindividuated metaphysical Will.”13 I will refer to this as the ‘simple monist 
interpretation.’ While two of Shapshay’s criticisms can, I think, be answered by merely clarifying 
that reading, the other criticism requires going beyond the simple monist interpretation. 
 
 
7 Shapshay 2008. 
8 Shapsahy briefly acknowledges the in-principle compatibility of the readings in Shapshay 2019b, 16. 
Janaway seems to acknowledge the compatibility as well though, like Shapshay, his emphasis is on how 
much of Schopenhauer’s view can be separated off of his monism (Janaway 2007, 61-2). 
9 This includes Shapshay 2019, Reginster 2015, Cartwright 2008, Janaway 2007, Young 2005, and 
Welchman unpublished. 
10 Marshall 2018, which shares some affinities with the proposal in Welchman unpublished. 
11 Shapshay 2019b, 3. 
12 Shapshay 2019a, 187. 
13 Shapshay 2019b, 12. Shapshay divides up her criticisms somewhat differently than I do, but not in ways 
that will affect my argument. 
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1.1. Restriction to living beings  
 
 Schopenhauer treats OBM as his most complete and detailed presentation of his ethical 
system (see WWRI 2:446, 404). In OBM, Schopenhauer seems to limit the scope of compassion 
to sentient beings. For example: “My true, inner essence exists in every living thing as 
immediately as it reveals itself in my self-consciousness to myself alone” (OBM 4:271, 254). 
Moreover, all Schopenhauer’s examples of compassion concern humans and non-human animals. 
Hence, David Cartwright claims that it is “uncontroversial” that, for Schopenhauer, “compassion 
is a relationship between sentient beings… One could not have compassion for a mountain” 
(Cartwright 2012, 259). Yet, Shapshay points out, Schopenhauer’s monist metaphysical view is 
that all things whatsoever – sentient or not – have the will as their essence. Hence, if the simple 
monist interpretation were correct, we would expect Schopenhauer to include all objects within 
the scope of compassion without restriction. Since he apparently does not, Shapshay suggests, we 
have reason to reject the simple monist interpretation.14 
 This objection can be answered by clarifying the simple monist interpretation. Shapshay 
is right, I believe, that the simple monist interpretation suggests that, in principle, compassion is 
possible with non-sentient things, and this point has often been missed by earlier commentators.15 
However, Schopenhauer might have simply been leaving this implication of his views out of 
OBM for presentational purposes. More importantly, there is some textual reason to think that 
Schopenhauer accepted compassion for non-sentient beings. In WWRI, he writes that, 
 
the noble-minded sort of person… recognizes, immediately and without inference, that 
the in-itself of his own appearance is the in-itself of other people’s too, that it is the will 
to life, and that it constitutes the essence of every single thing and is alive in all things; 
indeed, he recognizes that this extends even to animals and the whole of nature (WWRI 
2:440, 399) 
 
By adding the phrase “the whole of nature” after “animals,” Schopenhauer indicates that 
compassion can be felt for non-sentient beings. To appreciate why this is not an obviously absurd 
view, note that Schopenhauer’s claim that the will is “alive in all things” suggests a form of pan-
vitalism. He is more explicit about this pan-vitalism elsewhere, stating that “it is a mere pleonasm 
and amounts to the same thing if, instead of simply saying ‘the will’, we say ‘the will to life’” 
(WWRI 2:324, 301).16 Hence, saying that compassion extends ‘only’ to living things is not to 
restrict the scope of compassion, for Schopenhauer, since everything has the will to life as its 
essence. Schopenhauer’s discussion of the conflict inherent to all aspects of nature brings out his 
pan-vitalism vividly: 
 
Everywhere in nature we see conflict, we see struggle… Each level of the will’s 
objectivation is in conflict with the others over matter, space and time. The underlying, 
persisting matter must constantly change form as mechanical, physical, chemical and 
organic appearances… all crowd around, greedy to emerge and tear the matter away from 
the others (WWRI 2:174-5, 171) 
 
Moreover, Schopenhauer’s general theory of suffering arguably implies that everything with will 
(i.e. everything) can suffer. He states that “all suffering is nothing other than unfulfilled and 
 
14 Shapshay 2019b, 8; Shapshay 2019a, 187-190. 
15 One notable exception is Varner 1985. 
16 As Shapshay herself argues, much of Schopenhauer’s language is metonymic (Shapshay 2019, 49-51), so 
his use of ‘life,’ ‘living,’ etc. may often be as well.  
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thwarted willing” (WWRI 2: 429, 390). While he does not offer details on the suffering of non-
sentient beings, he does note that “even the vegetative part of our life is always accompanied by a 
quiet suffering” (WWRI 2:174, 171). Hence, even restricting compassion to things with the 
capacity for suffering, for Schopenhauer, is not a restriction to sentient beings.  
 Why, then, does Schopenhauer not offer any concrete examples of compassion for plants 
or inorganic objects? Shapshay herself provides the material for an answer here. She notes that 
“Schopenhauer’s system is in general characterized by degrees”,17 and that this suggests he 
believes different beings have different degrees of moral importance. For example, just after the 
claim about compassion for “the whole of nature,” Schopenhauer states: 
 
People’s rights to the lives and powers of animals are based on the fact that, because 
suffering increases along with the increase in the clarity of consciousness, the pain that 
animals suffer in death or work is not as great as that which humans suffer by doing 
without meat or animal power. (WWRI 2:440, 399) 
 
As we saw above, Schopenhauer seems committed to allowing even inorganic objects to suffer, 
since everything wills, and suffering just is unfulfilled and thwarted willing. Yet the suffering 
becomes less at lower levels of consciousness (even, at a vegetative level ‘quiet’), and lower, 
non-conscious levels of suffering call for less consideration.18 If the suffering of non-human 
animals is not sufficient to prohibit our eating them, then the suffering of plants and inorganic 
objects would be too negligible to be worth mentioning.19  
 
1.2. Contrast with malice 
 
 Schopenhauer claims that malice is morally worse than egoism, making the former the 
defining characteristic of evil (WWRI 2:428, 389) and calling it “moral badness raised to a higher 
power” (OBM 4:200, 194). However, Shapshay points out, the egoist and the malicious person 
would seem to be equally lacking in insight into the truth of metaphysical monism. Hence, the 
monist interpretation does not seem equipped to explain Schopenhauer’s normative ranking of 
non-compassionate dispositions.20 
 While defenders of the monist interpretation have had little to say about malice, there are 
at least two possible ways to clarify the interpretation to accommodate this point. The first is take 
Schopenhauer’s ranking to be based on the fact that only malice is the “direct opposite of 
compassion” (OBM 4:225, 215) in terms of what it disposes one to do. For Schopenhauer allows 
that one can rightly defend oneself from attack (e.g., OBM 4:222, 212), which seems to at least be 
consistent with some level of egoism, and states that “true friendship is always a mixture of 
selfishness and compassion” (WWRI 2:444, 403). Yet, on his view, no malicious actions are 
compatible with moral rightness (OBM 4:200, 193-4). However, Schopenhauer implies that the 
 
17 Shapshay 2019, 188. 
18 As Eric Aston pointed out to me, when he defends the moral considerability of non-human animals, 
Schopenhauer appeals to our shared will, not our shared intellect (OBM 4:241, 228). Of course, though he 
claims that all things have will as their inner essence, Schopenhauer cautions us not to understand “will” in 
the ordinary sense, which implies abstract motives and reason (see WWRI 2:132, 136). 
19 Gary Varner also suggests that, since Schopenhauer did not believe in individual characters for most non-
humans (see below), he may have also held that the ‘will’ of things like hydrogen atoms is merely for there 
to be at least some instance of their species somewhere (Varner 1985, 221). If Varner is right, then the only 
way to injure or wrong such entities would be eliminate their entire kind – something rarely within our 
abilities. 
20 Shapshay 2019b, 13-14 (cf. Shapshay 2019a, 183-4).  
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malicious person is epistemically worse than the egoist (OBM 4:265, 249), so this first 
clarification does not seem sufficient. Fortunately, there is a second, more epistemological way 
for the monist interpretation to accommodate Schopenhauer’s normative ranking. This would be 
to say that malicious motivation itself involves a commitment to others’ reality, whereas egoistic 
motivation does not. As far as egoist motivation is concerned, others can be regarded “only as 
masks, lacking reality” (WWRI 2:429, 390), and so as not as equally real as herself. The 
malicious person, however, is motivated to promote others’ internal suffering, and so must see 
them as equally real as herself. This motivational commitment therefore gives more weight to the 
apparent distinctness of fully-real individuals.21 Surprisingly, this means that the malicious person 
is, in one respect, epistemically better than the egoist: for only the former is (like the 
compassionate person) firmly committed to the inner reality of others. Importantly, however, 
Schopenhauer does not suggest that the malicious person is generally epistemically worse off 
than the egoist, only that, for her, the (illusory) spatiotemporal distinctions are more “great” 
(“groß” (OBM 4:264, 249)).22 By recognizing others’ inner reality, the malicious person 
strengthens her mistaken commitment to their spatiotemporal distinctness from her, whereas the 
egoist is less committed to that distinction (as far as her motivations are concerned, the egoist 
could regard them all as figments of her own imagination). On other epistemic fronts, the 
malicious person might be epistemically better than the egoist or the compassionate person. 
 
1.3. Schopenhauer is not a simple monist 
 
 On the simple monist interpretation, the compassionate person perceives that there is no 
distinction between herself and the object of her compassion, as some forms of metaphysical 
monism would imply.23 In some passages, Schopenhauer seems to state such a view. For instance: 
 
if time and space is foreign to the thing in itself, i.e. to the true essence of the world, then 
necessarily plurality is foreign to it also: consequently in the countless appearances of 
this world of the senses it can really be only one… [A]ll plurality is only apparent (OBM 
2:267-8, 251) 
 
[The assumption] that one and the same being could be in different places at the same 
time and yet wholly in each… is the most palpable impossibility, indeed an absurdity 
from an empirical point of view, still it remains absolutely true of the thing in itself, 
because this impossibility and absurdity rest merely on the forms of appearance… For the 
thing in itself, the will to life, is present in every being, even the slightest, wholly and 
undivided, as completely as in all beings that ever were, are and will be taken together. 
(P&PII 6:236-36, 201) 
 
However, Shapshay points out that Schopenhauer’s description of compassion suggests (a) that 
some distinction is still involved in compassionate insight and (b) that Schopenhauer’s larger 
metaphysics is not a simple monist one. I’ll expand on each point in turn before offering 
refinements of the monist interpretation that address them. 
 
21 In a similar vein, Reginster suggests that, on Schopenhauer’s view, the egoist “fails to recognize or 
appreciate fully the reality of others with interests of their own” (Reginster 2015, 263). 
22 Nor, for that matter, does he suggest that the compassionate person is generally epistemically better off 
than egoists. 
23 Not all forms, however: an ‘acosmist’ monist would hold that there are no individuals besides the one 
substance. 
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 On (a): in addition to positing moral distinctions between different things described 
above (differences in moral considerability), Schopenhauer states the compassionate person 
makes “less of a distinction” than others between herself and other sentient beings, not that she 
makes no distinction (OBM 4:265, 249). Shapshay points out that this phrasing reflects one of 
Schopenhauer’s central views about compassion, which is that the compassionate person feels 
suffering in the other, not in herself: “We suffer with him, thus in him: we feel his pain as his, and 
do not imagine that it is ours” (OBM 4:211-2, 203).24 This is not merely a phenomenological 
point. For Schopenhauer, compassion is essentially different from egoism – this is one of the 
cornerstones of his ethics and moral psychology (see OBM 4:196-9, 190-2). Hence, it seems 
crucial that the content of compassion involve some sense of the otherness of the object of 
compassion. 
 On (b): though the final section of OBM describes a metaphysical view according to 
which all individuation is mere appearance, Shapshay points out that Schopenhauer himself 
accepted a doctrine of noumenal Platonic ideas (the main topic of Book 2 of WWRI). 
Schopenhauer posits distinct ideas for different species of things, and also distinct ideas for each 
individual human. Taking up a modified Kantian view of agency, he then equates a human’s idea 
with her ‘intelligible character.’25 Despite not bringing up this point in OBM, Schopenhauer does 
emphasize it in his discussion of compassion in P&PII: 
 
the individual character of a person can be regarded as his free act… constituting his 
original and fundamental willing… Accordingly the entire empirical course of a human 
life… is as necessarily predetermined as the course of a clock… [T]he result is a moral 
one, namely that we know what we are by virtue of what we do… From this moreover it 
follows that individuality does not rest solely on the principium individuationis and is 
therefore mere appearance through and through; instead, it is rooted in the thing in itself, 
in the will of the individual, for his character itself is individual (P&PII 6:242, 206) 
 
Positing distinct ideas and distinct intelligible characters is not compatible with simple monism. 
Yet Schopenhauer emphasizes that the compassionate person, unlike the egoist or the malicious 
person, apprehends things correctly. Hence, simple monism cannot be part of the content of 
compassion for Schopenhauer. 
 Shapshay’s arguments here show that the simple monist interpretation is inadequate. 
They also, however, give guidance on how the monist interpretation should be developed. Instead 
of simply saying that the compassionate person perceives that there is no distinction between 
herself and the object of her compassion, we should say that she perceives them to not be distinct 
spatiotemporal individuals, that is, she perceives them to be distinct only in the way that Platonic 
ideas are distinct. The latter distinctness is not sufficient for individuality in the normal sense, for 
Schopenhauer, since he calls space and time alone the principle of individuation (OBM 4:267, 
250). The key difference is that, at the level of ideas, things metaphysically overlap with each 
other in ways that they do not at the spatiotemporal level.26 Though all humans have their own 
 
24 Shapshay 2019b, 8; Shapshay 2019a, 153-4, 173. Though this passage has rightly attracted 
commentator’s attention, a corresponding but more confusing passage in WWRI is worth keeping in mind, 
where Schopenhauer calls compassion “cognition of other people’s suffering, which is immediately 
intelligible from one’s own suffering and the two are considered the same” (WWRI 2:444, 402; see 
likewise OBM 4:229, 218 on suffering felt “as mine, yet not in me but in another”). 
25 See WWRI 2:185, 180; WWRI 2:265, 250; FW 2:48, 68. Schopenhauer holds that a person’s inner 
nature is manifested in their body (see, e.g., WWRI 2:221, 211). Hence, an apprehension of the others’ Idea 
can explain how we feel the pain as in their bodies – something I return to below. 
26 Hence, this connection is more than just beings parts of a single entity (cf. Reginster 2015, 272), which 
can happen at the spatiotemporal level. 
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ideas as intelligible characters, they are also all joined through “the Idea of human beings in their 
unity” (WWRI 2:479, 432; see also WWRI 2:265, 250-51). Not only that, but the idea of the 
human somehow requires all other ideas as well: 
 
Although it is in the human being, as (Platonic) Idea, that the will finds its clearest and 
most perfect objectivation, nonetheless, this Idea could not express its essence on its own. 
In order to appear in its proper significance, the Idea of a human being… must be 
accompanied by the stepwise descent through all animal forms, through the plant 
kingdom, and down to the inorganic… they are presupposed in the Idea of a person as the 
flowers of a tree presuppose leaves, branches, trunks, and roots: they form a pyramid 
with human beings at the very top. (WWRI 2:182-3, 178) 
 
Referring back to this doctrine later, Schopenhauer claims that, since the idea of humanity 
somehow contains all other ideas, the genuine annihilation of the former (were that possible) 
would somehow imply the annihilation of all other ideas. This is all quite unlike the normal 
individuation of objects in space and time, whose existence appears to be independent of one 
another: 
 
Nature, always true and naïve, states that the human race would die out if this maxim [of 
chastity] were universal: and… when the highest appearance of the will has fallen away, 
then animal existence, its weaker reflection, will fall away as well… If cognition were 
entirely abolished, the rest of the world would fade into nothing too (WWRI 2:449, 407) 
 
In case one was tempted to think this passage merely concerns appearances, Schopenhauer 
clarifies shortly thereafter that “[d]eath, in this case, does not just bring an end to appearance…. 
Rather, the essence itself is abolished” (WWRI 2:452, 409). So his point must be about the 
interdependence of ideas. 
 Striking as this last view is, it may only be a corollary of a more radical view. Earlier in 
WWRI, Schopenhauer indicates that the complete annihilation of any being whatsoever 
(presumably, down to its idea) would result in the annihilation of everything: 
 
It is not as if there is a smaller part of the will in a stone and a larger part in a person, 
since the relation between part and whole belongs exclusively to space… It reveals itself 
just as fully and completely in a single oak tree as in millions… Thus one could say that 
if, impossibly, a single being, however insignificant, were to be totally annihilated, the 
whole world would necessarily go down with it. (WWRI 2:152-3, 153-4)27 
 
Hence, in place of the simple monist interpretation, we should say that the compassionate person 
sees that she and the object of compassion are not distinct individuals, and so are unified at the 
level of ideas, though some sort of distinction between them remains. Different humans are all 
unified in the idea of humanity, which itself is united with all other ideas. Those ideas inform the 
content of compassion, without exhausting it (otherwise, of course the experience would be an 
aesthetic one). The compassionate person need not think of her insight in such terms, though – as 
I discuss in §2.1 below, her experience might be a phenomenologically simple one that in fact 
reveals this unity.   
 
27 See also P&PII 6:236, 201, where Schopenhauer jointly claims (a) that “the world in itself would persist 
unharmed and undiminished” even if every being in the world except one “perished” and (b) that “when a 
being, even the slightest, is completely annihilated, in and with it the entire world would have to have 
perished.” 
 9 
 This less-simple monist picture goes at least part way towards addressing one important 
objection to Schopenhauer’s view, namely, that it dissolves into egoism. As Julian Young puts it: 
for Schopenhauer, “the altruist does act for the sake of his own interest, the only difference 
between him and the egoist being that he acts for the sake of the interests of his metaphysical 
rather than his empirical self.”28 However, given the difference in ideas, some level of distinction 
remains, so the compassionate agent does not see her ‘metaphysical self’ as being the same as 
that of the creature she feels compassion for, even if their metaphysical selves overlap.29 
 There is another (compatible) interpretive option here worth mentioning. In §68 of 
WWRI, Schopenhauer suggests that the person who most completely sees through appearances 
feels all suffering as her own, and is thereby moved to leave moral action behind and negate her 
will through asceticism:  
 
But if this seeing through the principium individuationis, this immediate cognition of the 
identity of the will in all of its appearances, is present at a high degree of clarity, then it 
will at once show an even greater influence on the will… [A] human being, who 
recognizes… his innermost and true self in all beings, must also regard the endless 
suffering of all living things as his own… this is now all as close to him as his own 
person is to the egoist… [This] recognition of… the essence of things in themselves such 
as we described… becomes the tranquilizer of all and every willing. (WWRI 2:447-8, 
405-6) 
 
This passage suggests that the compassionate insight involved in moral virtue, while more 
accurate than what an egoist thinks, is incomplete. Perhaps simple monism really is true at the 
most fundamental level, but some level of distinction holds at some intermediate level. The 
compassionate, morally-virtuous person sees below the appearances, but not all the way down, 
which is why she maintains some sense of distinctness.30 Only the ascetic perceives the ultimate 
truth of monism, however, though a deeper kind of compassion. Ascetic insight, moreover, 
produces a “loathing” for the will (WWRI 2:449, 407). Perhaps this happens because only the 
ascetic perceives that all there is to any being is insatiable willing, whereas moral compassion 
might leave one room to hope for something else. If this is right, then the simple monist 
interpretation is correct, provided it describes the ascetic’s loathing-inducing insight instead of 
moral virtue-constituting compassion. For the latter sort of compassion, some non-simple 
interpretation remains necessary. 
 
2. Further questions for the Monist Interpretation 
 
 In this section, I turn to several textually-based questions for the monist interpretation 
that have received only passing mentions in the secondary literature. Addressing these questions 
 
28 Young 2005, 182. The objection was first made to Schopenhauer by Johann August Becker. For 
discussion, see Cartwright 2010, 509-11. Though many commentators have found the objection 
compelling, it does not seem obviously forceful to me. What seems morally worthless or vicious is acting 
for the sake of one’s individual self in a way the disregards the interests of other individuals (see 
Cartwright 2012, 262). Even on the simple monist interpretation, though, that is not what the 
compassionate person does, since she takes others’ interests to be hers as well.  
29 For beings without individual characters, however, preservation of their own species might still count as 
egoistic, then, instead of compassionate. But this seems like the right implication, given Schopenhauer’s 
views on reproduction (e.g., WWRI 2:326-7, 303). 
30 Cartwright endorses a similar reading, in a somewhat different context (Cartwright 2012, 250).  
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allows us to develop the monist interpretation further while bringing out some surprising aspects 
of Schopenhauer’s view. 
 
2.1. Is feeling or cognition of unity primary? 
 
 In some places, Schopenhauer seems to suggest that compassion’s content involves a 
mere feeling, whereas in other places he seems to suggest that it involves a recognition of some 
metaphysical fact. For instance, Schopenhauer claims that, in compassion, we “feel his pain as 
his, and do not imagine that it is ours” (OBM 4:211-2, 203), but later claims that the compassion 
involves someone “immediately recognizing himself, his own true essence, in the other” (OBM 
4:270, 253). The talk of feeling the others’ pain seems important for Schopenhauer’s moral 
psychology, insofar as it helps explain how compassion is able to motivate us to help others in the 
same way that our own pain motivates us (see OBM 4:229, 218). Moreover, since he takes us to 
feel others token pains, this phenomenological claim helps motivate his metaphysical explanation 
of compassion (OBM 2:212, 203). But how exactly does that feeling relate to grasping the fact of 
one’s metaphysical unity with another? After all, it seems one can believe that one is 
metaphysically unified with others without feeling any motivation regarding them, and it is 
tempting to think that a mere feeling could not itself be metaphysically informative, especially 
since Schopenhauer claims that “it is quite wrong to call pain and pleasure representations” 
(WWRI 2:120, 125).31 
 I suggest that the most plausible approach here is to take the feeling of another’s pain to 
be the primary content of compassion, and the metaphysical fact of unity to be secondary. There 
is a fairly straightforward historical precedent for this sort of link between feeling and unity. In 
the Sixth Meditation, Descartes famously claims that his bodily sensations taught him that he 
united to this body without being identical to it: 
 
Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not 
merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very closely 
joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit.32  
 
Descartes does not seem to hold that pains (and similar feelings) have any complex intrinsic 
representational structure, so we can understand this as implying that the feeling of pain in my toe 
when I stub it constitutes an awareness of the fact that I am united with that toe.33 All that can 
hold even if, as Descartes thought, the aspect of me most central to my identity (my mind) could 
exist without the toe. Schopenhauer can be understood as extending this approach beyond the 
normal boundaries of person. The compassionate person directly feels a token pain in another 
entity, and that constitutes her awareness of her unity with that other. Because the feeling 
constitutes that awareness, as opposed to being an inferential basis for it, Schopenhauer can 
 
31 Cartwright recognizes these different options, but, seeing them as incompatible, suggests that most 
charitable reading avoids attributing metaphysical cognition to the compassionate agent (Cartwright 2008, 
301; Cartwright 2012, 263). When Schopenhauer claims that pains and pleasures are not representational, 
he probably takes them not to have descriptive representational content, which leaves open the possibility 
of their having, say, imperatival content (see Marshall 2018, 243-7, which draws on Martinez 2011 and 
Klein 2015). The fact that Schopenhauer gives his core moral principle in imperatival form gives indirect 
evidence for this possibility (see §2.4 below). 
32 Descartes 1999, 56 (AT 7:81).  
33 In his correspondence with Princess Elisabeth, Descartes explains that such feelings somehow involve a 
“primitive notion” of the mind-body unity (Descartes 2007, 65; AT 3:665). Arguably, even that would be 
too much representational content for Schopenhauer. 
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coherently hold that compassion involves an immediate recognition of the unity (see, e.g., OBM 
4:270, 253), which points to the next question I’ll consider. 
 Before moving on, however, two more points are worth making. First, saying that the 
compassionate person directly or immediately feels another’s token pain does not imply that she 
has a complete compassionate grasp of it. Just as I can perceive the shape of an object (say, that it 
is cubical) without having every aspect of its shape revealed to me, so too can Schopenhauer hold 
that compassion involves feeling others’ pains without fully grasping their internal affective state. 
Hence, he writes that, for the compassionate person, “the suffering he sees in others affects him 
almost as much as his own” (WWRI 2: 440, 399, my emphasis, see also OBM 4:209, 200). 
Second, though Schopenhauer’s examples of compassion focus on suffering, and says that 
compassion “is restricted to [another’s] suffering and is not also aroused, at least not directly, by 
his well-being” (OBM 4:210, 202), compassion is not limited to simple states of pain. Remember 
that Schopenhauer defines “suffering” in very general terms, as all “unfulfilled and thwarted 
willing” (WWRI 2:429, 390). Similarly, in OBM, he says that once the distinction between I and 
not-I drops away, “only then does the other’s business, his need, his distress, his suffering 
[Angelegenheit des Andern, sein Bedürfniss, seine Noth, sein Leiden] immediately become mine” 
(OBM 4:229, 218). Not only does this show the breadth of compassion for Schopenhauer, but it 
helps show how compassion can move us to refrain from harming or otherwise interfering with 
others who are not yet experiencing pain or disappointment: we can feel their current ‘business’ 
as they strive towards goals they have not reached.34 
 
2.2. How do cognitions mediate compassion? 
 
 Schopenhauer emphasizes that the insight involved in compassion is ‘immediate’. For 
instance:  
 
for awakening compassion, which has been proved as the sole source of disinterested 
actions and consequently as the true basis of morality, no abstract cognition was required, 
but only intuitive cognition, the simple grasp of the concrete instance, to which 
compassion responds at once [Sogleich] without further mediation of thought 
[Gedankenvermittlung]. (OBM 4:246, 232) 
 
a truly good disposition, disinterested virtue, and nobility of mind do not start with 
abstract cognition, but do nonetheless begin with cognition—namely, an immediate 
[unmittelbaren] and intuitive cognition that cannot be reasoned for or reasoned away, a 
cognition that cannot be communicated precisely because it is not abstract. (WWRI 
2:437, 396–97)35 
 
However, Schopenhauer also claims, that compassion requires cognition of the other:  
 
since I am not lodged in the skin of another, it is solely by means of [vermittelst] the 
cognition that I have of him, i.e., the representation of him in my mind, that I can identify 
 
34 Along similar lines, Bernard Reginster glosses Schopenhauer’s compassion in terms of felt desires 
(Reginster 2015, 261). This provides part of an answer to David Cartwright’s objection that Schopenhauer 
cannot explain how compassion grounds the virtue of justice, that is, the virtue of not harming (Cartwright 
2012, 260-61). I give the rest of an answer below. 
35 Schopenhauer sometimes suggests that our cognition of others’ suffering just is our own suffering in 
some sense: “the only thing that can ever move [people] to perform good deeds and works of charity is the 
cognition of other people’s suffering, which is immediately intelligible from one’s own suffering and the 
two are considered the same” (WWRI 2:444, 402). 
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with him to such an extent that my deed proclaims that distinction [on which egoism and 
malice rests] to be removed (OBM 4:208, 200) 
 
This latter claim seems plausible: we feel compassion for other beings only if we have some 
antecedent awareness of their existence and the fact (or potential fact) of their suffering. Yet that 
would seem to mean that cognition mediates compassion, which would contradict 
Schopenhauer’s claims about compassion’s immediacy.36 
 I suggest that we can resolve this tension by considering an analogous aspect of 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. Fine art, for Schopenhauer, provides us an occasion for an immediate 
apprehension of the Platonic ideas. For example, he claims that “the great task of historical 
painting and of sculpture is the immediate and intuitive presentation of the Idea in which the will 
reaches the highest degree of its objectification [i.e., the Idea of the human]” (WWRI 2:260, 245-
6). Here we have another apparent tension, since it would seem that a (spatiotemporal) historical 
painting or sculpture helps, and so mediates, our awareness of the (non-spatiotemporal) idea. Yet 
the resolution of the tension in this case seems relatively straightforward: the painting positions or 
prompts us to have the immediate awareness of the idea. In the case of compassion, therefore, we 
can say that the cognition positions or prompts awareness of the others’ pain, but that awareness, 
once it happens, is nonetheless immediate.  
This proposal can be reinforced by considering whether compassion, for Schopenhauer, 
extends to entities for which we have no present perception. 
   
2.3. Is compassion confined to the present? 
 
 If compassion involves accurately and immediately feeling another’s suffering, then it is 
tempting to think that the other’s suffering must be actual and present, and therefore that 
Schopenhauer can only allow for compassion with entities that presently exist.37 This would be a 
significant restriction, especially since many of Schopenhauer’s own examples of compassion 
seem to involve anticipatory compassion – e.g., his case of Titus, who refrains from killing a rival 
when he realized “what would really happen to him” (OBM 4:232 – OUP 234). In cases like this, 
the suffering the compassionate person feels averse to is not merely non-present, but also non-
actual, since it never comes to be. In some cases, it might be enough to have compassion for a 
person’s current striving or ‘business’ (as noted in §2.1 above), but an adequate theory of 
compassion as the basis for ethics should also apply to entities, such as future generations, with 
no present conscious states at all. 
 Fortunately, Schopenhauer’s monism does not require a restriction to the present and the 
actual. He takes space, time, and modality to be metaphysically ideal. While the discussion in 
OBM only mentions the ideality of space and time (e.g., OBM 4:267), in WWRI he states 
explicitly that compassion goes beyond the actual: 
 
From the perspective of the true nature of things, everyone must regard all the sufferings 
of the world as his own; in fact, he must regard all merely possible suffering as actual, so 
long as he is the steadfast will to life, i.e. so long as he affirms life with all his strength. 
(WWRI 2:417, 380, my emphasis) 
 
36 Reginster seems to think that Schopenhauer only takes awareness of others’ suffering to be mediated for 
the egoist (Reginster 2015, 266), but passages like the above show that an interpretive paradox of 
immediacy arises for the compassionate agent as well.  
37 David Cartwright makes this argument, taking it as grounds for saying that Schopenhauer cannot derive 
the virtue of justice from his own account of compassion, and that he should have instead have based it 
merely in imaginative representation instead of in metaphysical perception (Cartwright 2012, 260-61). 
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All the miseries of others that he sees and is so rarely in a position to alleviate, all the 
miser he learns about indirectly or in fact only knows to be possible, all these affect his 
spirit as if they were his own… as he sees through the principium individuationis, 
everything is equally close to him. (WWRI 2:447, 405, my emphasis) 
 
The latter passage here is drawn from §68, where Schopenhauer discusses how compassion 
ultimately leads beyond moral virtue to the denial of the will. So Schopenhauer seems to think 
that full compassion with the actual and the non-actual leads to the quieting of the will. While that 
full compassion might always take subjects beyond moral virtue, Schopenhauer can coherently 
hold that moral virtue involves compassion for some merely possible suffering. 
 Extending compassion beyond the actual also makes Schopenhauer’s ethical views more 
plausible. One common criticism of compassion and related phenomena like empathy is that they 
are biased towards present entities – illustrated perhaps most tragically by otherwise decent 
people’s indifference towards the suffering of distant migrants and future generations.38 For 
Schopenhauer, however, restricting compassion to the present would be akin to the error of 
egoism, which also privileges the here and now. By tying compassion to the realization of any 
being’s suffering anywhere, he has an epistemic basis for criticizing many actual instances of 
compassion as being short-sighted. 
 
2.4. How does the content of compassion relate to Schopenhauer’s imperatival principle? 
 
 In the previous three subsections, I suggested several refinements to the monist 
interpretation. One might object, though, that these refinements go beyond what Schopenhauer 
himself thought, given the simplicity of his central moral principle: “Harm no one, rather help 
everyone to the extent that you can” (OBM 4:137, 140). This principle, which he takes to be 
based on compassion, says nothing about the priority of feeling, metaphysical unity, immediacy, 
time, or modality. Yet it is, he holds, the “reservoir” or “container” of compassion (OBM 4:214, 
205), which provides the basis for much compassionate action.39 Hence, we have some grounds 
for denying that Schopenhauer took compassion to have the sort of content I have been 
describing. 
 However, Schopenhauer did not hold that articulable moral principles could fully capture 
the content of compassion. Recall his claim that virtue “does indeed come from cognition, but not 
from abstract cognition that can be communicated through words” (WWRI 2:434, 395) and that 
the compassionate insight “is not truly and adequately expressed in words” (WWRI 2:437, 397). 
More generally, he holds that abstract knowledge is to intuition “as a mosaic is to a van der Werft 
or a Denner”, that is, to use a contemporary metaphor, that abstract knowledge is necessarily 
more course-grained (WWRI 2:67, 81). We should expect, then, that the abstract principle would 
be merely a partial reflection of the content of compassion. As Shapshay notes, we might regard it 
as a “rule of thumb” (Shapshay 2019a, 185). While the principle stores up compassionate 
motivation, that process of storage might lose some of the structure and detail of the original 
 
38 See Prinz 2011, Bloom 2016. In a similar vein, Shapshay worries that compassion is not sufficient for 
right action, and needs to be combined with reason to appropriately engage with non-present suffering 
(Shapshay 2019a, 163-4). In earlier work, I suggested distinguishing between short-range and long-range 
compassion, where the latter has a more plausible connection the morality (Marshall 2018, 13; see 
Reginster 2015, 257 on a similar idea in Nietzsche).  
39 Shapshay holds that acting from the principle is not acting from compassion (Shapshay 2019a, 203). 
Though there is a sense in which this is right, Schopenhauer’s metaphor suggests that the principle ‘stores’ 
compassionate motivation for later action. By analogy: one can store spring water to drink later, and when 
one drinks it later, one is still drinking spring water.  
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compassion, just as bread loses its original texture when reg. Hence, we should not think that we 
can read the content of compassion or virtue directly off of Schopenhauer’s moral principle. 
 That answer might seem to raise its own difficulty, though. In this paper, I have been 
using words to describe the content of compassion. I take it that these words, like the ones from 
Schopenhauer I have been citing, should be seen as the best we can do in reflecting on the content 
of compassion, but no substitute for the real thing. This gives us an additional reason to take the 
feeling of another’s pain as the primary element of compassion, since it is a familiar thought that 
one cannot really know pain without experiencing it.  
 Here, then, is the refined monist interpretation of Schopenhauer’s views of the content of 
compassion. Prompted by some sort of cognition of Y, X immediately (but incompletely) feels 
Y’s (actual or non-actual, present or non-present) pain, which thereby constitutes her awareness 
that she is united to Y.40 
 
3. Conclusion: Monism and Inherent Value? 
 
In the introduction, I bracketed the question of whether a monist interpretation could be 
combined with an axiological interpretation like Shapshay’s. One way to bridge the monist and 
inherent value interpretations would be to find some definitional or conceptual truth about value 
that implied that the monistic insight concerned value. By analogy: it is arguably conceptually 
true that anything scarlet is red. If I see that some flowers are scarlet, then, we can also say that, I 
also see that some flowers are red (at least insofar as I have the relevant concepts). To conclude, I 
want to point to some textual grounds for thinking Schopenhauer accepted some such bridge 
between monistic content and evaluative content. 
Bernard Reginster has claimed that Schopenhauer rejects the very possibility of intrinsic 
value, given his broadly instrumentalist definition of “good” as “the suitability of an object to any 
particular effort of the will” (WWRI 2:425, 387; see also OBM 4:161, 161 on “worth”). Reginster 
takes this to mean that recognizing another as good, for Schopenhauer, therefore is merely a 
matter of recognizing them as egoistically useful.41 Against Reginster, Shapshay proposes that 
Schopenhauer also implicitly recognizes a non-instrumental and non-relative sense of goodness 
that applies to the inherent value of sentient beings.42 However, it is not obvious that moral 
goodness must be inherent goodness, and it is possible to hold that some forms of goodness are 
necessary and universal without being inherent (the latter is sufficient, e.g., to avoid distasteful 
moral relativism). Some constuctivist Kantian views appeal to something along these lines,43 and 
Schopenhauer himself suggests as much just after introducing the definition of ‘goodness’ that 
Register mentions: 
 
As with all other beings that can entertain relations with the will, people also called 
human beings good if they were advantageous… to the goals that were being willed at 
the moment… Now it was in some people’s character not to get in the way of the 
 
40 As Cartwright suggests, the difference between morally just and fully compassionate agents may be a 
matter of how profoundly they feel this compassion (Cartwright 1988, 33), though this topic deserves more 
discussion. One might also ask: how does fuller compassion lead to resignation? Here is the start of an 
answer: if (as I suggested in §1.3), ascetic compassion involves a simple apprehension of the will, then the 
subject of such compassion feels the unsatisfiablility of all existence. Such an apprehension leaves no room 
for thoughts of alternatives, and so no hope. This might understandably then lead to a loathing for the will 
(WWRI 2:449, 407; see also Cartwright 1988, 35).  
41 Reginster 2012, 162. 
42 Shapshay 2019a, 180. 
43 See Langton 2007 for a helpful discussion. 
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endeavours of the will of others, but rather to promote them, and they were thus 
thoroughly helpful, benevolent, friendly and charitable; they were called good human 
beings, because of the way their actions related to the wills of others in general. (WWRI 
2:426, 387, my emphasis) 
 
In short, compassionate people are necessarily and universally good, since compassion makes one 
suitable to other efforts of will through non-interference (in the virtue of justice) and helping (in 
loving-kindness). Contrary to what Reginster suggests, then, a subject can recognize that certain 
others are good not merely in the sense of being useful to her, but also, if they are compassionate, 
as being generally useful. It is not odd to see a link between general usefulness and moral value – 
after all, David Hume defined moral virtue partly in terms of general usefulness.44  
The line of thought just described implies only that compassionate people are good, not 
that every sentient being (sentient of otherwise) has value. On the other hand, Schopenhauer 
claims that “[t]he three fundamental ethical incentives of human beings, egoism, malice, 
compassion, are present in each one in different and incredible diverse proportions” (OBM 4:252, 
23845), and that some small degree of compassion generates the anguish of conscience in 
evildoers (see WWRI 2:432, 393). Hence, at least all humans, on Schopenhauer’s view, will have 
some degree of goodness that potentially could be revealed in a compassionate apprehension of 
their wills.46 Insofar as this concerns only humans, and suggests there are wildly different degrees 
of goodness corresponding to different levels of compassion, it falls short of Shapshay’s inherent 
value interpretation, on which all sentient beings have roughly the same value (Shapshay 2019a, 
183). Shapshay’s interpretation is not only philosophically attractive, it also has some textual 
basis, for Schopenhauer objects to the “denial and defamation” of non-human animals in other 
moral systems (OBM 4:239, 227, cited at Shapshay 2019a, 182), and seems to attribute 
“unfathomable significance” (“unergründerlicher Bedeutsamkeit”) to “everything that has life” 
(OBM 4:162, 162, cited at Shapshay 2019a, 18).47 
However, there is another route to grounding inherent value in the monist interpretation, 
though it requires going one step beyond the text. Schopenhauer aside, the following seems like a 
plausible conceptual truth: if it is intrinsically pro tanto wrong to interfere with X’s activity, then 
X has some moral value (or worth, significance, dignity, etc.). For example, interfering with the 
activity of a computer is not intrinsically wrong, since computers have no moral value. However, 
it does seem intrinsically pro tanto wrong to interfere with a person’s activities on a computer 
(say, by pulling the plug), since people do have some moral value. Other factors might override 
the pro tanto wrongness, of course, but part of what we have in mind in taking an entity to be 
 
44 Hume took our core moral sentiments to be responses to qualities of others that are generally useful and 
agreeable (Hume 1983). Schopenhauer does not engage with Hume’s ethical views, which is odd, given his 
admiration of Hume and his detailed knowledge of his work (see Cartwright 2010, 177, 418-19). 
45 In WWRII 3:697, 607, he acknowledges a fourth ultimate motive, connected to asceticism, which is the 
pursuit of one’s own woe. It is not obvious how to categorize this motive morally. 
46 At WWRI 2:417, 379, Schopenhauer mentions the possibility that, in addition to humans, “even the more 
intelligent animals” might have some share of compassion. 
47 Cf. WWRI 2:113, 119 for a related use of “Bedeutung.” In the same OBM passage, Schopenhauer seems 
to imply that humans rightly see themselves as valuable (‘werthe’), though he elsewhere states that humans 
are “on the whole worthless” (WWRI 2:415, 378). But Shapshay takes Schopenhauer to be internally 
conflicted about the value of existence, so passages like the latter do not threaten her reading (see also 
Murdoch 1993, 65). Moreover, we can understand the claim about human worthlessness in terms of how 
much compassion and so genuine usefulness (Humean virtue) they have (for Schopenhauer’s dimmest 
statement on the extent of human compassion, see OBM 4:198, 192), which is independent of other types 
of value. 
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morally valuable is that interfering with her activity is morally problematic. Schopenhauer might 
not explicitly endorse this notion of moral value (he says that “non-comparative, unconditioned, 
absolute worth… simply cannot be thought (OBM 4:167, 166)), but that may not matter much: 
we might simply have a different concept of value or worth than he does. Yet, using this 
wronging-based notion of moral value, it will follow from Schopenhauer’s views that every being 
has moral value. For he defines wrongness just as the interference with or “violation of the 
boundaries” of another’s will (WWRI 2:394, 360), and holds that every being’s activities stem 
from its will (see WWRI 2:136-7, 140). Since his definition of wrongness invokes no extrinsic 
factors, it implies that all interference with other beings’ wills is intrinsically wrong. It becomes 
clear that this wrongness is pro tanto, which is why Schopenhauer thinks it is permissible to eat 
animals (OBM 4:245, 231). Therefore, provided we acknowledge that we are using a notion of 
moral value or worth that Schopenhauer himself does not explicitly endorse, we can say that 
compassion does reveal what amounts to moral worth, insofar as it reveals facts about suffering, 
which itself arises from interference with others’ willing. Hence, a monist reading can come very 
close to Shapshay’s inherent value interpretation. The two interpretations agree that we would not 
be motivated to help others if we saw them as worthless (cf. Shapshapy 2019, 180), though the 
monist reading does not say that perceiving others as valuable explains the motivation to help 
them, but rather that our motivation constitutes or provides the basis for the more intellectual state 
of perceiving others as valuable (arguably thereby making normal compassion simpler). 
I have not attempted to argue for the philosophical plausibility of metaphysical monism 
here, and I expect that most readers who find Schopenhauer’s views on compassion otherwise 
attractive will want to find ways to set it aside. Nonetheless, having a fuller understanding of the 
metaphysical content Schopenhauer attributes to compassion promises to improve our 
understanding of how compassion fits into his larger system. It also should encourage us to think 
about what metaphysical content compassion might have, a topic that has received relatively little 
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